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JEFFREY M. HERTZFELD*

Industrial Contracts with the East
It has been a rather brief period of time; not much longer than a decade,
since industrial cooperation emerged as a promising new vehicle of East-West
business. During this period, the evotution has been rapid. European and
Japanese companies, including some subsidiaries and licensees of American
firms, were first to realize the potential. However, in more recent years, in an
improving political climate, a growing number of American companies have
become directly interested in the opportunities in the Eastern markets, and in
the possibilities for obtaining a lasting foothold there through long-term investment of resources.
There is every reason to believe that this process will continue to expand,
since it responds to important needs on both sides. To Western firms it
promises, at a time when traditional markets are saturated, substantial new
export outlets for their capital goods and equipment. To Eastern governments,
it promises an infusion of applied technical sophistication badly needed to
modernize their economies.
Even the Soviet renunciation of the Trade Agreement in January 1975 has not
seemed to dampen their desire to pursue industrial projects with American
firms. Indeed, in the intervening three months since that renunciation, I have
been to Moscow three times and have seen three agreements signed with our
U.S. clients.
There is a challenging role to be played by the lawyer advising his client or his
company in this highly specialized field, for to advise how to proceed, how to
negotiate, how to structure agreements, he must understand not only the legal
regime, but also something of the fundamentally different economic, social and
political environment of the East, with its own peculiar motivations, objectives
and constraints.
Industrial cooperation, as that term is used in East-West practice,
encompasses a great variety of transactions, ranging from simple license
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agreements to complex investments in joint production. It may entail the
transfer or exchange of technical knowledge and experience either in the form of
patents or know-how, the licensing of trademarks, the supply of turnkey plants
or complete processes, the exchange of components, semi-finished goods, and
even finished products manufactured under license, technical assistance,
services and training programs in connection with industrial activities, joint
marketing arrangements in each other's territories, as well as in third countries,
occasionally established through jointly owned stock companies set up in the
West, joint research and development activities, and in the case of Yugoslavia,
Romania and Hungary, joint venture companies based on equity sharing, a
fascinating subject in itself which will be dealt with in a separate session of this
Institute.
The essential characteristics of all of these arrangements are, first, their
long-term character, usually extending over a number of years; and second, the
inclusion of reciprocal responsibilities in production, exchange of technology,
marketing, or the like, which go beyond the straight sale of goods and services.
A common feature of most cooperation projects is the Western supplier's
undertaking to counterpurchase some of the products manufactured with its
assistance or under its license with a view on the one hand to defray the hard
currency cost to the Eastern party of the production contract, and on the other
hand to provide the Western party with a presumably economic and reliable
source of supplies for its own use, resale, or other disposal.
It might be well to inject here that East-West industrial cooperation is gradually becoming a two-way street-in that we are now beginning to see a reverse
flow of technology. Inventions developed in the East can sometimes be exploited
effectively in the West. There was recently an announcement in the press of a
firm in Texas that had bought a Soviet process for several million dollars which
they expect to develop and use in the American market. As long as seven or
eight years ago the Czechs successfully licensed a U.S. firm with know-how for
the production of soft contact lenses, which the licensee has now successfully
marketed in many Western countries. There is a growing number of such cases.
That being said, in the context of the present Institute, my remarks are aimed
primarily at transactions in which the Western party will be the supplier of plant
equipment or technology, rather than the purchaser.
There are many basic questions to be answered before one can hope to arrive
successfully at a cooperation contract in the world of the foreign trade
monopoly. Your client must know where and how to spark interest in a
proposed project, the role of the Eastern government in the negotiations, the
authority and responsibility of the bureaucrat sitting opposite you at the bargaining table, and the ways in which the Eastern objectives are similar to or
different from those typical in the West.
The answers to these and other similarly fundamental questions are not the
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same for all Eastern countries. There have been significant economic reforms
taking place throughout the East, so that today important divergences exist in
the ways and means by which these countries do business with the West.
There has, however, been a common trend toward direct participation by
production enterprises in negotiations with foreign firms. It has gone so far in a
few cases that the end-user enterprise not only attends the negotiations but may
even replace the foreign trade corporation as the contract principal. For
example, in Hungary since the 1968-69 economic reform, well over a hundred
industrial enterprises have been authorized to engage directly in import and
export.
To the extent that this avenue to the end-user is open, it greatly facilitates the
negotiating process by enabling the real partners to speak directly to one
another early in the game, both on technical and commercial questions. While
the Soviet Union remains the bastion of the foreign trade monopoly system,
even there we are beginning to see signs pointing toward gradual
decentralization, with All-Union Industrial Associations assuming new responsibilities in production for export. However, to a large extent the classic Soviet
economic model is still generally applicable throughout the East and, of course,
in the U.S.S.R. itself.
Under this model, all commercial activity turns around the national economic
plan devised by a central planning agency and implemented by state-owned
enterprises. These enterprises act pursuant to directives which they receive from
their respective ministries. The plan has the force of law and regulates the
allocation of resources, production objectives, pricing, and so forth.
The foreign trade aspect of the plan falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, which enjoys the monopoly over all commercial
activities with foreign firms. The Ministry oversees a number of foreign trade
corporations which conduct the actual day-to-day negotiation and conclusion of
specific contracts. Each of these corporations is entrusted with a particular
segment of the monopoly, consisting either of a category of goods, technology or
services, or geographical region, and in its area conducts the total import-export activity of the country.
Thus, in most cases it will be with the specialized foreign trade corporation
that a Western firm wishing to establish local production will ultimately have to
negotiate and contract. However, while the foreign trade corporation may be the
legal partner, the real party in interest in an industrial cooperation venture will
invariably be the domestic enterprise of an industrial ministry. It is this enterprise that will be called upon to make the internal investment and commit the
effort and resources on the Eastern side in connection with the startup of new
production. It is, therefore, at the internal ministerial level that the company
must spark interest and cooperation, and at this operative level it should seek to
define the technical aspects of a specific project.
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Access to the client ministry remains a more complicated matter in the Soviet
Union than it now is in many of the Eastern European countries, and warrants
some further comment. A possibility to gain exposure, if not access, lies in
participation in industrial expositions organized by the U.S.S.R. Chamber of
Commerce and Industry or by means of privately organized seminars, symposia, and other promotional activities. However, a particularly effective
access-utilized especially by the larger Western firms-is via a protocol
agreement negotiated directly with the Soviet State Committee for Science and
Technology. As of April 1975, more than 170 such agreements have been concluded by Western firms, including 37 by leading American corporations such
as Occidental Petroleum, General Electric, Hewlitt-Packard, Control Data,
FMC, Kaiser Steel, Coca Cola, Allis-Chalmers and others.
The State Committee is a direct arm of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
and consequently is a governmental body of ministerial status. Its function is to
supervise and coordinate all research and development activities in the Soviet
Union, including the organization of industrial and technological cooperation
with foreign countries.
A framework agreement with this body can serve several distinct and important purposes. First, it singles out the Western company to Soviet business as a
most favored partner. Secondly, it constitutes a direct governmental pledge to
pursue a long-term relationship with that company, valid for repeated transactions over many years.
Finally, and of great practical significance, it makes available State Committee auspices to facilitate contacts and negotiations with the relevant ministries and organizations.
This being said, it should be understood that such an agreement is a protocol
rather than a contract. To implement specific deals, it will still be necessary first
to structure a mutually acceptable technical agreement with the relevant ministry; and second, to negotiate and conclude implementing contracts with the
relevant foreign trade corporations.
What, then, does the framework agreement actually say? Generally, it defines in broad terms the scope of cooperation which the parties agree to explore
together and calls for the establishment of groups of experts who will meet on a
regular basis to consider the feasibility of specific proposals and to elaborate
concrete programs and projects for joint implementation. In essence, the framework agreement not only facilitates technical contacts; it institutionalizes them.
In the more complex East-West projects, the technical negotiation phase can
be a long and slow process, as the parties become acquainted with each other's
capabilities and try to work out the parameters of a mutually acceptable project.
Where the project requires the participation of more than one ministry due to
the range of technology or equipment involved, the bureaucracy and decision
making can aggravate the time factor considerably.
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There are a number of Eastern objectives in structuring technical projects
which seem to recur with few exceptions as an almost standard philosophy. To
the extent that the Western party can anticipate these objectives and can render
them compatible with his own, it may be possible to significantly shorten the
technical stage of negotiations.
For example, it is a common objective of Eastern enterprises to seek to
maximize the use of domestically produced equipment and materials in
connection with cooperation projects in order to reduce the hard currency
expense of the transaction. It is often advisable, therefore, for Western parties
to define separately those items of standard equipment and possibly special
equipment which may be locally sourceable.
Even in the so-called turnkey projects, the Eastern side should be expected to
supply locally available equipment, as well as the building itself, necessary
utilities, and, of course, local labor. Naturally, items which are critical to the
technological processes involved or which reflect the proprietary know-how of the
Western party must remain its responsibility.
A second common Eastern objective is to focus complete responsibility for
delivery of all foreign plant, equipment and technology upon a single Western
party, who then functions as a prime contractor, assembling the necessary
equipment, material and licenses to supply a total package.
From the Eastern standpoint, it is cumbersome and often unfeasible to
attempt to negotiate multiple contracts for the implementation of a single
project. Indeed, where they have tried to do this, as the Soviets have done in the
mammoth Kama River project, for example, there have been dramatic
problems of bad coordination. Whether a Western company can afford to
assume this kind of responsibility is, of course, another question. Where a
significant part of the plant project involves equipment and technology
belonging to third parties, such an approach may expose a company to substantial risk, not to mention the enormous burden of negotiating a great number of
subcontracts and licenses with its own suppliers. However, where such an
approach is manageable, it may well be desirable to contemplate it from the
outset in preparing a cooperation proposal. Not only may it speed up the
technical negotiation process; it may also increase the chances of overall project
success since there will be greater certainty of appropriate supply within the
required time frame.
Still another Eastern objective in industrial cooperation projects is the possibility of selling back to the Western partner some of the product
manufactured under license. From a commercial standpoint, the purpose here,
of course, is to help offset the hard currency cost of plant and technology.
However, from a technical standpoint, the willingness of a Western party to
commit to such counterpurchase is also an assurance that the technology which
InternationalLawyer, VoL 10, No. I
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the Eastern party is receiving is indeed modern and competitive on world
markets.
While there are obvious difficulties in predicting long-term purchase
requirements, it is desirable for the Western firm to try to define an order of
magnitude for counterpurchase potential if any exists at an early stage, since the
level of contemplated purchasing can substantially affect the size of a given
plant and the quantities, types and values of equipment to be delivered. Where
this issue has been deferred too long, I have seen it result in an expensive
duplication of effort in re-scoping the project to allow for additional capacity.
One more typical objective which might be added to this list of illustrations is
the Eastern desire to seek maximum if not total operational independence in the
licensed activities as soon as possible. To this end, early targets are usually
requested for equipment deliveries, transfers of know-how, plant erection and
installation under Western supervision and phasing in of local supplies and
materials.
When this work is completed, the Eastern party would like to be able to
operate with little or no continuing Western support. In many cases, this objective may not, as a practical matter, be obtainable given the level of existing
local skills in the particular industry and taking into account the additional time
which experience shows must be factored into any work program to be performed in the East as compared the West.
It also may not be compatible with the interests of the Western party. For
example, where there is a long-term commitment to counterpurchase a licensed
product, or where a health product or a trademark may be involved, the
Western party may need to be able to control quality and implement improvements during the production process on a continuing basis extending well
beyond plant startup.
In some of the East European countries, continuing Western assistance for
this and similar purposes can occasionally be agreed upon in one form or
another. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, there remains a strong
aversion to such open-ended arrangements. This being said, there is reason to
believe that the concept of ongoing on-site participation is gaining ground and
may soon be more readily obtainable throughout the East, at least where a clear
need for it can be shown.
The serious commercial negotiations at the Ministry of Foreign Trade normally begin after basic agreement has been reached on the scope of the
technical project. The commencement of these negotiations can be something
akin to taking a cold shower. After having spent months developing a rapport
and a mutual understanding with the end-user enterprise, a company is confronted with a new partner who may have only a limited familiarity with the
transaction, and whose principal motivation appears to be to buy as much as
possible for as little as possible.
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Here, again, good preparation can save time and avoid pitfalls. Over many
years, as buyers and sellers of goods and equipment, the foreign trade corporations in the various Eastern countries have developed rather standardized
approaches in their dealings with Western firms, which are reflected both in
their contract forms and in their negotiating tactics.
As a result, it is often possible to anticipate the issues which are likely to arise
and to develop in advance the most suitable strategy. Conceptually, the foreign
trade corporations tend to view industrial projects as involving principally sales
of equipment, with ancillary supply of know-how and assistance.
In my own experience, this conception if often diametrically opposed to that
of Western parties, who frequently view the very same projects as a supply of
know-how and assistance, with the equipment sales being ancillary.
The difference is more than semantic. It can have considerable impact on the
definition of the scope of the contract, the obligations of the parties, the performance guarantees, the payment terms, and other key provisions.
In order to cope with this problem, and at the same time avoid a protracted
and frustrating battle over contract forms, a pragmatic solution which I have
personally found to be effective on many occasions, is to structure the client's
proposal in a form familiar to the Eastern party, but with a content designed to
protect the client's interests and reflect his objectives. If it is properly done, this
contract proposal may serve as the text for final discussion. At the very least, it
will enable you quickly and effectively to integrate your positions with those of
the Eastern side in the event that it counter-proposes its own text.
This can be very important under the time and logistical pressures of the final
round of negotiations.
Much has been published in recent years on the subject of Eastern standard
contracts, and in particular their emphasis on specific and timely performance
of obligations, with strict guarantees and stiff penalties for late delivery, their
distinctive view of fbrce majeure as concerns strikes on the one hand and Acts of
State on the other, their special approaches to dispute settlement and choice of
law, and the like.
While this is essential material in preparing you for a commercial negotiation, it should not leave you with the impression that Eastern form contracts are
sacrosanct and non-negotiable; on the contrary, today nearly any provision,
even in the Soviet-form contracts, is open to negotiation and can be modified
within limits which are being stretched daily.
Moreover, while the formal contract will typically relate to the supply of
equipment, other matters can be creatively elaborated in specially adapted
contract appendices. The possibilities for innovation are particularly great in
these appendices, since by necessity they are unique in each transaction. Here,
for example, it is possible to develop the notion of a project partnership, with
common goals and separately defined responsibilities, or a technical assistance
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. I
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program so broad that it constitutes a defacto management contract valid for a
term of years.
This being said, there are two obvious prerequisites for negotiating the most
favorable terms and conditions. First, that you enjoy a good bargaining
position; that is to say, that the Eastern side wants the deal, has the budget, and
would prefer your client over another firm. Second, that you have the ability to
distinguish between real issues critical to the Eastern party and those raised
purely for tactical purposes, and the know-how to deal with these issues as they
arise.
Just as there is flexibility in negotiating contract forms and appendices, there
is also flexibility in negotiating the all-important price and payment terms. It
has been customary practice in the past for Eastern negotiators to pressure
Western companies early in their discussions for firm prices and detailed price
breakdowns for plant and equipment.
Many Western firms accede to these demands, in my opinion, prematurely,
only to discover later on that the scope of the project has grown or that the negotiations have lasted longer than expected, with inflationary strains on their
pricing, or that new risk and cost factors have been injected into the original
terms and conditions.
These companies learn the hard way that it is difficult to negotiate a price
increase even where it is clearly warranted. The foreign trade corporations justify
their very existence by their ability to obtain price discounts. It takes considerable convincing to increase the price, once quoted.
Firms can and should sidestep such demands for specific price information,
or defer them until late in the day when a final contract is in view. Not only will
this enable the Western party to define a price which reflects the agreed scope
and conditions of the contract and current costs; it also will limit the Eastern
party's ability to shop for competitive prices on individual items of equipment
and will, thus, substantially simplify the ultimate price negotiations.
The question of pricing itself is, of course, a highly judgmental one which will
vary from case to case. There is, however, a common dilemma. Where an initial
price is stated too high there may be no negotiation at all. Where it is stated too
low, you may have insufficient flexibility to make the final concessions which are
typically demanded by Eastern negotiators.
It is becoming increasingly common for the foreign trade corporations to
accept escalation clauses in their agreements for supply of plant and equipment
with Western firms. To the extent that this is available, it may provide at least a
partial escape from this dilemma.
Obtaining compensation for patents and know-how, either under separate
license agreement or in conjunction with sales of plant, is a subject unto itself.
Hard currency compensation is obtainable and can take the form of a lumpsum payment or fixed installments, or even periodic royalties based on production.
InternationalLawyer,Vol. 10. No. I
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The difficulty with fees based on production or other performance criteria is
that of monitoring or controlling the activities of the license, since access to the
local plant and market is still relatively restricted, especially in the case of the
Soviet Union.
One possible approach which enables the Western licensor to enjoy a share of
the market without excessive risk is a production royalty with guaranteed annual
minimums based on the plant production program. If the plan under which the
project is taking place is increased, the Western party will share in the additional benefits. If the plan is decreased, he will nonetheless receive the agreed
upon minimum return for his invested technology.
A particularly hard point to negotiate in industrial cooperation licenses is the
value of know-how. Where technology is in the form of locally registered patents,
it is considered as tangible property with an ascertainable value. However, unpatented proprietary know-how which, by definition, remains intangible and
undisclosed until after contract signature, is considered to be a "pig in a poke,"
or, as the Russians call it, a "cat in the bag."
While the Western company can justify its know-how fees by demonstrating its
investment in research and development as well as the successful results its
technology has produced on other markets, in the final analysis the willingness
of the Eastern party to pay for the real worth of know-how will depend on the
uniqueness of its availability and its importance to their economy.
There are two more fundamental points which I would stress to Western firms
when pricing know-how. First, regardless of whether a license is characterized
as exclusive or non-exclusive, as a practical matter in almost every case they
should understand that they will probably not be able to license the same
technology twice in the same Eastern country, since there is only one potential
partner under the usual foreign trade monopoly system. Yugoslavia is an
exception to this.
Secondly, they should understand that as a general rule Eastern licensees
consider that they are purchasing know-how and not merely obtaining a right to
use. In effect, they view periodic royalties as equivalent to installment payments
on the purchase price. Consequently, for financial as well as other reasons, it is
usually in the interest of the Western party to seek a long duration to a license
contract, and if it is likely that the know-how will not be obsolete at the end of
the term, to provide for continued confidentiality after contract expiration.
A basic price element in most industrial cooperation contracts is the cost of
supplying Western technical services, assistance and training in connection with
plant installation and startup. While payments for such services are usually
subject to separate remuneration, the levels of compensation rarely cover the
actual salary, not to mention overhead costs, of highly skilled Western
personnel.
Indeed, it is not hard to understand that in countries where the manager of a
factory may be earning less than $400 a month, there may be some reluctance to
lnternationalLawyer,Vol. 10, No. 1
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pay Western technical experts $4,000 to $6,000 a month for on-site assistance.
It is often wise, therefore, to anticipate this by allocating a percentage of the
cost of services to other elements of the contract where such costs can be more
easily rationalized by the Eastern side.
A final topic which I would like to address briefly is that of financing hard
currency costs. The subject is a complex one and will be treated in depth in a
separate session of this Institute. However, there are a few general comments
which are needed here as well.
As you know, East-West industrial projects can range in cost anywhere from
less than a million dollars to more than a billion. In most multi-million dollar
projects, medium- to long-term credits are required to finance initial hard
currency outlays, although there have been some significant recent exceptions
where the Soviet Union has agreed to pay cash for rather sizable projects.
These credits, as well as credit guarantees, have been obtainable on favorable terms from private banks and government agencies in Western Europe,
Japan, and subject to some well-known limitations, the United States. In some
instances, credit is arranged on a government-to-government or bank-to-bank
basis. However, in many cases it is the Western party himself who arranges the
credit facilities, either by extending his own commercial credit without recourse
to a banking institution, or by seeking private bank credit with or without
government-sponsored export credit guarantees and insurance facilities.
If such credits are to be repaid by the Eastern party in cash at fixed dates,
with payments guaranteed by their foreign trade bank, there should be no
substantial difficulties. The credit worthiness of most of the Eastern countries is
considered to be excellent and their promissory notes and other debt instruments are readily discountable in the West. The only concern here is to work
into the price of the contract the spread between the cost of private financing
and the interest charges which Eastern parties are willing to pay. With falling
interest rates, this, too, is becoming less of a problem.
Problems can arise, however, in projects which contemplate Western counterpurchases of products manufactured with the supplied equipment and technology. In such cases, particular attention should be paid to avoid any contractual link between the Eastern party's financial obligations and the Western
party's counterpurchase commitments. Where such a link exists, it is often impossible to obtain an unconditional guarantee from the foreign trade bank for
cash repayments of the credits extended, with the result that the transaction
becomes unbankable in the West and unmanageably expensive for the Western
party.
Let me conclude at this point with my thanks for your kind attention.
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